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INTRODUCTION 
On 16 July 2019 Ursula von der Leyen, who had 
been proposed as candidate for the post of 
Commission President by the European Council 
at the beginning of the month, was elected by the 
European Parliament (EP) with 383 votes, just 
nine votes above the required threshold of 374. 
This narrow result no doubt reflected a divided 
EP, but it also translated a sense of frustration on 
the part of many MEPs on the way the European 
Council had picked the candidate. They resented 
the fact that contrary to 2014 the name put 
forward this time was not one of the 
Spitzenkandidaten designated by the various party 
groupings to lead the lists for the EP elections2. 
There were accusations of back room deals, of 
ignoring democracy, and of spurning the directly 
elected parliament. The reality is a bit more 
complicated. 
Since this is a debate that is far from over, it 
makes sense to have a closer look at the way of 
choosing the Commission President and setting 
up the Commission, with a special focus on the 
events of 2014 and 2019. This will allow us to 
better understand the arguments used by the 
various protagonists and above all to deepen our 
analysis of the way the Union functions and the 
changes that some want to bring to the system. It 
is important to understand that while this is very 
much a power game between institutions, it is 
also a debate on the way the EU should develop 
in the future. 
 
 
In 2014, the European Parliament staged a 
small 'coup' when it imposed the EPP 
"Spitzenkandidat" Jean-Claude Juncker as 
the new Commission President, on the basis 
of a rather innovative reading of the Treaty. 
In 2019, the attempt at renewing this 
operation failed, because of some of the 
inherent flaws in the concept, and because 
the conditions were no longer the same. The 
European Council was quick to reclaim its 
prerogatives as set out in the Treaty. This 
may however not be the last word and a 
revised version of the Spitzenkandidaten 
could possibly emerge from the upcoming 
conference on the future of the EU. But any 
such move towards a more federal Europe 
requires an informed and transparent debate 
and cannot be introduced via the back-door.  
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A UNION OF STATES AND PEOPLES 
The best way to start from is to recall what the 
Treaty says about the choice of the Commission 
President in Article 17(5) TEU: "Taking into 
account the elections to the European Parliament and after 
having held the appropriate consultations, the European 
Council, acting by a qualified majority, shall propose to 
the European Parliament a candidate for President of the 
Commission. This candidate shall be elected by the 
European Parliament by a majority of its component 
members." The Treaty thus clearly sees an 
important role for both institutions; the choice of 
the President of the Commission is a shared 
competence. This is very much in line with the 
very nature of the European Union, which is a 
Union of States and peoples. The candidate 
derives his or her legitimacy first from being 
chosen by the European Council, where the 
Member States are represented at the highest 
level, then by being approved by the directly 
elected European Parliament3.  In the light of this 
double legitimacy, the argument frequently heard 
in euro-sceptic circles that "the Commission is a 
bunch of unelected officials" is completely off the 
mark. More generally, the division of powers 
between the Council (and the European Council) 
and the European Parliament also belies the 
frequently heard assertion that the EU has a 
"democratic deficit!" We will come back to that 
point. 
The Treaty of Lisbon (hereinafter: the Treaty or 
Treaties) also gives very clear indications on what 
is requested of the members of the Commission 
and of the Commission as a whole. 
Commissioners are put forward by their 
respective national governments and they “shall be 
chosen on the ground of their general competences and 
European commitment from persons whose independence 
is without doubt.”(Article 17 (3) TEU) And the 
Treaty adds: “In carrying out its responsibilities, the 
Commission shall be completely independent.” This is a 
key point which should not be forgotten in the 
heat of the argument about the Spitzenkandidaten. 
The choice of words in the Treaty points towards 
the Commission being an independent institution 
at an equal distance from the other players in the 
institutional triangle, not to an alignment on one 
of them. The sui generis nature of the 
Commission is further underlined by its threefold 
role, that of the holder of the sole right of 
legislative initiative, that of guardian of the 
Treaties, and that of some form of executive 
agency. 
THE IRRUPTION OF THE 
SPITZENKANDIDATEN CONCEPT AND 
THE "COUP" OF 2014 
It is fair to say that the institutional set up has 
allowed the Union to develop and to thrive as 
well as to weather many storms! It has of course 
evolved over the years, with a sequence of 
significant Treaty reforms between 1985 and 
2009. One of the key developments in that 
respect has been the growing involvement of the 
EP in the legislative process, especially since its 
first direct election in 1979. This has been very 
much in the logic of a Union of States and 
peoples, with the ordinary legislative procedure 
being, since the Lisbon Treaty, a sharing of the 
power between the Council and the EP. In the 
pursuit of this objective, the EP has frequently 
used, and to great effect, the slogan of a 
"democratic deficit" in the EU that had to be 
dealt with by awarding more powers to the EP. 
While this slogan certainly had a justification in 
terms of adopting Union legislation, there has 
been a tendency to use it in a somewhat 
indiscriminate way to call into question the very 
nature of the EU system as a whole. This has led 
to interpretations of the Treaty that do not always 
stand up to an objective analysis. 
The debate about the Spitzenkandidaten is an 
interesting case in point. The concept is relatively 
simple. Citizens voting in the EP elections should 
have a say on who becomes the next Commission 
President. The way to do this, so the argument 
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goes, is for political groups and parties at the 
European level to pick as lead candidates (that is 
what the German term of Spitzenkandidaten 
means) personalities that would be seen as 
candidates for the post of President of the 
Commission.  
This was precisely what the political parties did in 
2014. Several factors facilitated what one may call 
a little political "coup": there was a majority 
within the EP of the two major groups, the EPP 
and the S&D, a quick agreement was reached 
between the two and endorsed by a majority of 
MEPs, and there was a candidate who happened 
to have spent many years as a member of the 
European Council, Jean-Claude Juncker. So 
when the EP signalled right after the elections 
that it would not vote for any other candidate, it 
got away with it. Many of the Heads of State or 
government were uneasy with this procedure, but 
the vast majority did not want to reject a 
candidate that they considered as one of them. 
Only the British PM and the Hungarian PM 
voted against. 
The result of this was of course that the 
procedure foreseen in the Treaty was stood on its 
head: while the Treaty gives the European 
Council the right to put forward a candidate, who 
then needs the votes of a majority of the 
component members of the European 
Parliament, the approach imposed this time 
meant that the latter in fact put forward its 
candidate first who then needed a qualified 
majority in the European Council! The European 
Parliament used the fact that the Treaty asks the 
European Council to choose a candidate, "taking 
into account the elections to the EP", to great 
effect4. But there is quite a difference between 
taking into account the elections and accepting an 
automaticity between the choice of the EP and 
the decision of the European Council, which in 
fact deprives the latter of any margin of 
manoeuvre. Moreover, this is at odds with the 
fact that there are other criteria like the 
geographical and gender balances that are actually 
more explicitly spelt out in other parts of the 
Treaty than the party political balance5.  This is 
the reason why the European Council, while 
deciding on the name of Juncker in 2014, adopted 
a declaration saying that it would come back to 
the issue in view of the 2019 elections. 
THE 2019 INSTITUTIONAL CYCLE: A 
SETBACK FOR THE SPITZENKANDIDATEN 
MODEL 
In February 2018, the Heads of State or 
government gathered to discuss the upcoming 
institutional cycle. In this context, as they had 
decided in 2014, they came back to the issue of 
the Spitzenkandidaten. They took note of the 
possibility for parties to organise elections as they 
saw fit, but made it very clear that there could be 
no automaticity between a possible majority 
choice of the EP and the decision of the EUCO 
on a candidate for the post of President of the 
Commission. This set the stage for the events 
that happened after the EP elections in May 2019. 
This time, at least four elements played against 
the Spitzenkandidaten idea:  
• the February statement of the European 
Council: the unequivocal stance of the Heads 
meant that the EP could not count on its tactics 
working without a fight, with the risk of creating 
an interinstitutional conflict;  
• the absence of a candidate with Juncker's 
credentials: the tradition since 1995 has been to 
nominate a former Prime Minister as President of 
the Commission. The fact that Juncker was 
available in 2014 made it possible to reconcile this 
tacit requirement with the acceptance of a 
Spitzenkandidat; 
• the refusal of the ALDE group to play the 
game: while in 2014 this group had been one the 
fiercest supporters of the new concept, this was 
no longer the case in 2019. The reason for this is 
interesting: it had to do with the possible arrival 
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of President Macron's party into the group and 
above all the recent vote of the European 
Parliament against the idea of setting up 
transnational lists for the EP elections. Macron 
and the group that was later on renamed "Renew 
Europe" considered that in the absence of such 
lists the Spitzenkandidaten idea was flawed6. 
• the absence of a majority on any of the 
candidates within the EP: this time, any majority 
required at least the participation of the three 
major groups. Both liberals and socialists refused 
to accept the principle that the first choice would 
automatically be the lead candidate of the biggest 
group, i.e. Manfred Weber from the EPP. The 
Parliament in fact did not manage to agree on any 
candidate of its own, in spite of having renewed 
its pledge for the Spitzenkandidaten process in late 
May7.   
This of course left the field open for the 
European Council to play its role as foreseen in 
the Treaty. After some quite animated 
discussions, the leaders agreed on 2 July 2019 by 
consensus, with the notable abstention of the 
German Chancellor, on Ursula Von der Leyen as 
the candidate for the post of President of the 
Commission. This was part of a wider package 
also including Charles Michel as President of the 
European Council, Christine Lagarde as 
President of the European Central Bank, and 
Josep Borrell as High Representative. This led to 
some fierce recriminations and a nail-biting 
election in the European Parliament. 
WHITHER NOW? ARGUMENTS AGAINST 
THE SPITZENKANDIDATEN MODEL IN ITS 
PRESENT FORM  
It is impossible to say whether the concept of 
Spitzenkandidaten is dead or not, especially since 
there seems to be wide-spread agreement to 
launch a reflection process in the shape of a 
Conference on the future of Europe. It is unlikely 
to survive in its current form, both because the 
conditions of 2014 will not be replicated, and also 
because the concept as it has been applied so far 
has a number of flaws, at least in the eyes of some 
key players: 
1. Any automaticity between the result of 
the EP elections and the choice of the candidate 
by the European Council would deprive the latter 
of its right and even obligation to make its choice 
with the necessary margin of manoeuvre. That is 
the reason why the leaders excluded such an 
automaticity in the future.  
2. The argument used by many in the 
European Parliament that there is a "democratic 
deficit" in the EU system and that the only way 
to overcome this is to hand over power to the EP 
is flawed. It is predicated on the idea that the 
situation within the EU is or should be analogue 
to the one existing at the national level in most of 
our Member States, where the elections yield a 
majority in parliament, and this majority forms a 
government. The problem with this is two-fold: 
the Commission is not the European 
government; the EU system is a system of checks 
and balances and it is based on a double 
legitimacy, that of the States and that of the 
peoples. The former translates via the Council 
(and European Council), the latter via the directly 
elected European Parliament. The "democratic 
deficit" does not exist in reality; there can be and 
there are different ways of ensuring democratic 
legitimacy. The EU system is admirable in 
combining the two legitimacies. In other words: 
the logic of the Spitzenkandidaten idea is at odds 
with the philosophy behind the EU institutional 
set-up.  
3. The model does not integrate the fact that 
the President of the Commission, while having a 
say about the future members of the 
Commission, cannot choose them freely among 
some political majority: according to Article 17 
(7) TEU  ("The Council, by common accord with the 
President-elect, shall adopt the list of the other persons 
whom it proposes for appointment as members of the 
Commission.") They shall be selected, on the basis of the 
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suggestions made by the Member States…". Those 
suggestions will of course reflect the respective 
political majorities in each Member State, and this 
can easily result in a majority that is different 
from the majority reflecting the EP elections at a 
given time. What kind of political party 
programme is the Commission as a college 
supposed to pursue in that case? 
4. The Treaty is very clear that the 
Commission, in carrying out its responsibilities, 
shall be completely independent. Independent 
not only from the Member States, but also from 
the other institutions including the European 
Parliament: "Without prejudice to Article 18 (2), the 
members of the Commission shall neither seek nor take 
instructions from any Government or other institution, 
body, office or entity." (Article 17(3) TEU) The 
Commission has always been political in the 
sense of being an independent institution with its 
own agenda and role. The way the Commission 
is being set up shows that it is a political 
institution and that it enjoys legitimacy. But as a 
college, it has never been political in the sense of 
party politics. Like in the Swiss system, all the 
main political forces are traditionally represented 
in it because the members are put forward by 
their national governments. The political 
sensitivities, like the national ones, are thus 
represented, but that is not the same as saying 
that the Commission should be bound by a party 
political majority in the EP, nor by national 
considerations as expressed, for instance, at the 
Council level.  
5. One of the arguments put forward in 
favour of the Spitzenkandidaten is that it allows the 
European citizens to vote for the person they 
want to see at the head of the Commission. That, 
we are told, is what the European citizens want. 
It is always a bit dangerous to talk about "the 
citizens" as if they were a compact group having 
the same wishes. Some maybe do want the EU to 
mirror the way things are done nationally and are 
in favour of moving towards the United States of 
Europe. Others may like the idea without 
realising that this could lead to a very different 
EU from the one they are familiar with. But many 
others do not participate in the EP elections 
(where the participation rate is relatively low 
incidentally, even though 2019 saw a very 
welcome increase ) to elect the President of the 
Commission; they rather vote to send to 
Strasbourg and Brussels the people who in their 
eyes best represent their national sensitivities in 
the EP.  
6. The only citizens who could directly vote 
for one of the Spitzenkandidaten were the citizens 
whose nationality was represented among the 
Spitzenkandidaten. But even that is of little help to 
someone who traditionally votes for the EPP or 
the S&D and the Spitzenkandidat of his nationality 
(if there is one) happens to run for the Greens. 
Moreover, people voting for a party affiliated to 
the S&D or EPP did not necessarily want to cast 
a vote for Timmermans or Weber whom most 
voters outside of Germany and the Netherlands 
hardly knew. Assuming simply that any vote cast 
for such a party was a vote for those persons is 
bordering on usurping their votes, since there is 
no indication in the Treaties that the purpose of 
the EP elections is to directly elect a President of 
the Commission. 
A JOINT REFLECTION ON A MAJOR 
INSTITUTIONAL REFORM: CAN THE 
SPITZENKANDIDATEN MODEL BE 
REVIVED? 
While the Spitzenkandidaten model seems doomed 
in its present shape, the debate is not over. It will 
certainly flare up again if the suggestion of a 
conference on the future of Europe that has been 
put forward by some in the context of the 
nominations process is implemented. In that case 
the idea of linking the Spitzenkandidaten model to 
a major reform of the electoral system by setting 
up one or several transnational lists will come up 
again. This is certainly worth exploring since it 
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would allow to remove at least some of the 
artificiality of the Spitzenkandidaten system as it has 
been applied hitherto. It would notably open up 
the possibility for all European voters to cast a 
vote for the various candidates for the post of 
President of the Commission. This is not the 
appropriate place to go into a detailed analysis of 
such a concept. We will simply point out that the 
idea requires much further thinking and studying; 
some of the questions raised in this short article 
will still be valid and others will come up, such as 
the risk of creating two classes of MEP. 
This would be the occasion for a serious debate 
about what kind of Europe we want. One of the 
problems with the Spitzenkandidaten saga has been 
that it took the EU into uncharted waters without 
there having been a serious discussion about what 
this meant for the system. The latter is too 
important and too precious for it to be 
fundamentally altered via the backdoor and by 
seemingly innocuous changes in the practice of 
nominating the President of the Commission. In 
many ways, the Spitzenkandidaten approach 
partook of an "AS IF" world: people behaved as 
if the Union was more like a State, as if there was 
one European people, as if the Commission was 
the European government, as if the EP was the 
sole source of legitimacy and as if the Council was 
just a second legislative chamber, subordinated to 
it. That is not the best way of improving the way 
we communicate about the European Union: 
talking about the EU as if it were all of that and 
then measuring it against that yardstick rather 
than against the yardstick of what it is and is 
meant to be is not a recipe to make the citizens 
better understand the Union. 
Introducing a half-way politicisation is a risky 
business. It will most likely not lead to the result 
some dream of, i.e. a European government, but 
it may well end up destroying what was the 
traditional legitimacy of the Commission: a 
political body composed of people representing 
all the various political sensitivities in the Member 
states, a body that is independent and defends the 
common good, a body that is outside the daily 
electoral fray and hence has the possibility to 
think the long term and to put forward bold ideas, 
a body that because it is not politicised in the 
traditional sense of the term can be trusted to 
enforce the respect of the law and have extensive 
powers in competition for instance. Already now, 
even though the Juncker Commission has been 
in most ways a classical Commission, there have 
been some visible side-effects of the new 
rhetoric, with at times negative consequences. In 
the migrants' crisis of 2015, the Commission 
chose to ignore the warning signs coming from a 
very divisive discussion on the idea of quotas of 
migrants that took place among the Heads of 
State or government in April 2015 and pushed for 
such quotas, in a close political alignment with 
the political majority in the European Parliament. 
The effect has been to split the EU in two or 
more parts and to open wounds that will take a 
long time healing. 
Europe needs an honest debate, with a 
confrontation of ideas, where all sides can make 
their views known and where a consensus will 
hopefully emerge on the future nature of the EU. 
It will be a good way to know whether there is a 
large buy-in for a more politicised Commission 
and for a move towards a more federal Europe. 
If there is, then this should be clearly set out and 
explained. If not, it would be preferable to stop 
using rhetoric, like the one about the 
Spitzenkandidaten, which is at odds with the system 
as it is presently defined in the Treaties. 
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